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Abstract

Trevor Rockstad: Motivating Genocide: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivator of

Genocidal Ideology and Policy
(Under the direction of Dr. Megan Shannon)
In this study I have explored indirect colonial rule as a motivation of genocide.

I

use case studies of the 1994 Rwandan and 1975 Cambodian genocides to illustrate the
way that indirect colonially rule divided societies, creating colonially relegated and
colonially elevated sections of society. Genocide becomes a more likely possibility if the
colonially relegated group gains power after decolonization.

If this group does gain

power, it will pursue a policy of retribution for oppression suffered during the colonially
period, repression of the colonially elevated group, and minimization of the return to the
colonially order in which they were the relegated group. Under the right conditions,

these divisions can result in genocide.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In 1994, members of the Rwandan Hutu ethnicity began a large scale killing of
members of the rival Tutsi ethnicity. The systematic, state-sponsored murder of Tutsi
men, women, and children was carried out by Hutu militia and citizens alike. As Hutu
hunted for Tutsi with their blood covered machetes, the Tutsi body count rose higher and
higher.

A strong ethnic divide, which had widened to the point where Hutu refused to

acknowledge the humanity and individuality of each Tutsi, led to the killings. In 1994,
every Tutsi was deemed the enemy of the Hutu ruling class. According to the Hutu, the
enemy class was no better than cockroaches and so deserved to die.

When the Rwandan killings ceased, the death toll had reached a disputed level
somewhere between 500,000 and one million Rwandan Tutsi.

What led to such an

extreme case of ethnic conflict, in which people were murdered based solely on their
ethnicity? Were the Hutu perpetrators simply deranged psychopaths with an innate desire
to kill? This seems unlikely because a large portion of the Hutu population took part in
the genocide.

Surely an entire population was not born with a need to kill or with an

inherent hate for the Tutsi ethnicity. The perpetrators of this terrible crime were human,
and to view them as anything else is to misunderstand the motivations of genocide
(Midlarsky 2005, 10). Rather than a common hate or a desire for destruction, these Hutu,
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and many other genocidal perpetrators, were driven to kill by historically motivated
ideology.
Genocide has occurred throughout history with very few instances of prevention.
Why should we take the time to study genocide?

The empirical and theoretical study of

genocide is a relatively new field of inquiry. The term genocide was not coined until the
early 1940s and was not prohibited by the international community until 1948. We
should explore the motivations and circumstances underlying genocide, so that we can
predict and prevent it in the future. If the international community is aware of what
causes genocide, it will be more able to intervene or recommend social, economic, or

political measures to prevent its onset. Once a genocidal episode has begun, intervention
!S

is difficult and diplomatic efforts are often futile.
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For prevention to become a plausible option for the international community, an
understanding of genocidal ideology and policy must be established. The possibility for
genocide exists in a wide array of countries, largely unique in their politics and history,
and yet many of these countries have certain common attributes.

In this study I do not

claim that any one aspect of a country’s society, economy, history, or political system is

the sole cause or motivation of a genocidal episode. An assertion of this nature would be
absurd, as each country’s genocide is the result of a distinct series of events. I argue that
certain historical and social characteristics make countries more susceptible to genocide.
These specific characteristics may not always cause genocide, but combined with other
internal and external forces, they will create an environment more favorable to genocide.

I suspect that one characteristic that promotes genocide is a history of indirect
colonial rule.

In such a colonial administration, which characterized colonial Africa and

much of colonial Asia, a section of society is elevated to an elite status in order to rule on
behalf of the colonial authority.

This elevation of one section of the population leads to a

severe and imposed division within the society of the colonized country.

For various

reasons, this division creates an environment in which genocide is able to emerge.

Though I assert that this history of indirect colonial rule is a possible motivation of
genocide, it is not the only motivation.

It is one aspect which provokes genocidal

ideology and increases the likelihood that this ideology will emerge in policy.
In Chapter Two I establish a basic definition of genocide in order to clarify what

differentiates it from other forms of mass murder.

I provide an introduction to genocide,

as a basic understanding of the crime is necessary to any further exploration into its
motivations. In Chapter Two, I also explain the list of genocidal episodes which I use
throughout this study in order to illustrate the relationship between indirect colonial rule

and genocide.

In Chapter Three I explain my hypothesis and my theory. As my theory

involves indirect colonial rule, a contrast to direct colonial administration, I discuss the

distinct features of each form of colonialism. I also discuss the reasons for indirect
colonialism’s link to genocide.
that support my theory.

In Chapters Four and Five IJ introduce the case studies

Chapter Four explains the relationship between indirect

colonialism and genocide in Rwanda and Chapter Five explains the relationship in
Cambodia.

Each of these chapters includes a brief history of the pre-colonial era and the

colonial period, highlighting the changes implemented in Rwandan society by the
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colonial authority.

I also discuss the events of decolonization and the years which

followed, culminating in each country’s genocide.

Each of these histories is written in

the context of the link between indirect colonialism and genocide. Through this study, I
hope to offer some insight into the motivations of genocide.

I do not claim that my

theory is the only explanation for genocide, but that it is one which can provide an
understanding of many genocidal states.

This theory will make us more capable of

predicting some future occurrences of genocide.

Chapter 2: Introduction to Genocide

Prior to any study of the causes and sources of genocide, a definition of the act

must be established. The term genocide was invented by Raphael Lemkin during World
War Il, a time when the crime was an increasingly apparent problem, but was still the
topic of very little scholarship.

Lemkin defined the newly-coined word as “a coordinated

plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of
national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1944, 79).
The word which he used to describe this act of group annihilation is a combination of the
Greek word genos (race or tribe) and the Latin word cide (killing), giving the word its
core definition (Lemkin 1944, 79). Though definitions of genocide often vary among
genocidal scholars, many find origin in Lemkin’s definition, along with the Genocide

Convention or Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of the United Nations.

Approved by the United Nations’ General Assembly in 1948, the

Convention defines genocide in the following manner:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with

groups, as
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious
such as

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c)
its
(d)
(e)
the

Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
physical destruction in whole or in part;
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group (Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, Article II).

Though these initial definitions of genocide do not mention the destruction of a
group along political lines, political genocide, or politicide, will be included in this
study’s established definition.

The killing or mistreatment of non-combatants with the

goal of an eventual extermination of an entire group, whether this group is aligned
nationally, ethnically, racially, religiously, or politically, is equally contemptible.

The

first draft of the United Nations’ Genocide Convention included killings with political
motives under the term genocide, but the draft was rejected by the Soviet Union.

This

rejection is the primary reason for the final draft’s failure to mention political killings in
its definition of genocide (Harff 2003, 58).
The lines between politicide and genocide are sometimes blurred, presenting

difficulties in the decision to only examine instances of genocide along national, ethnic,
racial, or religious lines, while neglecting episodes of politicide. An example of this lack
of concrete distinction between genocide and politicide, which is often evident in
genocidal occurrences, can be seen in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

While the

widespread killing of Tutsi by Hutu was primarily based on ethnic motives, the situation
was highly political. Additionally, the sources of the genocidal ideology which initiated
and encouraged the killings were equally political, as each ethnic group possessed a
specific political past and existed as a distinct political entity within the country. This
example will be discussed in more detail in later examination of the Rwandan genocide.
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For the time being, I argue that politicide and genocide have similar sources and
structures (Harff 2003, 58) and so will be considered one and the same in this study.

For an instance of widespread killing to be considered genocide, it must meet two
criteria. First, the victims must be non-combatants.

A massacre of a large number of

soldiers involved in combat does not constitute genocide, because the victims of genocide
are non-combatants according to the U.N.’s definition. Lemkin explained genocide as
the opposite of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine, which states that warfare is “directed
against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians’(Lemkin 1944, 80).
Though this contrast between simple warfare and genocide is logical, it is possible to
translate this assertion into an argument that all instances of total warfare, in which cities
are bombed with no regard for the safety of the civilian population, are genocides. As an
example, the American use of nuclear weapons against Japan during World War II is, by
some genocide scholars such as Kuper, termed genocide. Though civilians are often
killed, sometimes in high numbers, during the bombing of cities, nuclear or conventional,

these tragic deaths should not be labeled as genocide (Fein, 1994 99). These occurrences
might be examples of war-crimes, but the civilian population’s direct relationship with
the enemy state prevents them from being episodes of genocide.

Though these attacks

do target non-combatants who offered no real threat and had no opportunity to surrender,

the civilian population must be completely disassociated from the state in order for these
killings to be termed genocide (Fein 1994, 105). Supporting this claim against the use of
the term genocide to describe all acts of war which target civilians, Chalk states: “If we

10

include every form of war, massacre, or terro
rism under genocide, then what is it that we
are studying?”(Chalk 1994, 60)

The second criterion for genocide is that
it must be state sponsored. However, in
instances of civil war, non-state actors are
possible perpetrators of genocide (Harff 2003,
58). This factor often presents difficulties
in the process of deciding if an episode of

widespread killing is genocide. In many cases, the state does not admit
its involvement
in the killings. This is one reason why the intern
ational community is often hesitant to
use the term genocide. While an example of genoc
ide such as the killing of European
Jews by the Nazi Germany state is easily classi
fied as an instance of state-sponsored
genocide, the current massacres of Sudanese
non-combatants in the Darfur region of

Sudan are more complex due to the lack of concrete proof of
the Sudanese government’s
involvement.

With these two factors considered, along with the decision to include
politicide in
this study, a definition of genocide can now be established. Genocide is the
statesponsored attempt to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial,
religious, or

political group by exterminating non-combatants of such a group through such acts as
described in sub-topics a through e of the United Nations’ 1948 Genocide Convention.

While I use the terms national, ethnic, racial, religious, and political alignment to define
the types of groups that are potential targets of genocide, these types of groups should not

be considered the only possible targets of genocide. Any distinct group of human beings,

whose members are aligned along a consistent motivation, is a potential target of
genocide.

To require a group to be aligned along an established list of specifications is to
11

risk the neglect of certain groups, such as the thousands of homosexuals and mentally
impaired individuals who fell victim to the Nazi genocide (Chalk 1994, 50).
Though the crime of genocide has a significant history, I am concerned primarily
with episodes that occurred after the colonized sections of the world began to gain
independence and create their own autonomous governments.

Examples of genocide

from the 19" century and early 20" century provide little evidence toward an argument
for the relationship between indirect colonialism and genocide, as decolonization had not
yet occurred when these genocidal episodes took place. I will occasionally reference precolonial episodes of genocide in order to illustrate certain aspects of the genocidal state,

as much of the literature on this topic is primarily concerned with pre-colonial genocide.
The list of genocidal occurrences which will be used in this study originates from
two lists compiled by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr.

The first list is from a study

performed by Harff and Gurr in 1988 and includes occurrences of genocide from 1943 to

1985.

The second list is found in a study performed by Harff in 2003 and includes

instances of genocide occurring from 1956 to 1999. Because these lists were formed by
the same authors, they have many similarities in the instances occurring between the
common years 1956 and 1985. In the formulation of these lists, genocide and politicide
are:

The promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by
governing elites or their agents—or in the case of civil war, either of the
contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal,
political, or politicized ethnic group (Harff 2003, 58)
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This definition is similar to the United Nation’s definition, and so the two lists compiled

by Harff and Gurr are adequate for the purposes of this study. Though the lists are
sufficient, they omit a few instances of widespread killing which seem to fit the definition

of genocide.

The primary reason for this neglect is the fact that many of the possible

instances have not yet been analyzed (Harff 1988, 366). It is beyond the scope of this
study to classify these unanalyzed episodes of genocide, and so I focus solely on those
identified by Harff and Gurr.
The majority of genocides occur in similar environments, and the perpetrators of
each one possess similar ideologies. These factors are general aspects of the genocidal
state, which are common to the genocidal episodes of the last fifty years. Almost all
genocides took place during or immediately following revolutions, regime collapses, or
civil wars. An unstable political situation, which is inevitable during these periods of
turmoil, creates an adequate environment for genocide. The ideologies behind these
revolutions, regime collapses, and civil wars are often translated into genocidal ideology,
as the new regime or government targets its enemies (Harff 2003, 57). This does not
necessarily mean that the revolution, regime collapse, or civil war is the cause of the
genocide, but that it creates an environment in which genocidal ideologies and policies
are able to emerge.

Another factor common to genocidal states is a severe division within the society
of the country. This division and its relationship to genocide are the primary concerns of
this study. The definition of genocide requires two groups of people to be separated
nationally, ethnically, racially, religiously, or politically to an extent that allows for
13

violent ideologies and policies. The rift between the two groups must also be great
enough to lead to an ignorance of individuality. All members of the would be victimized
group become guilty of the real or imagined crimes for which the group is being blamed.
Similarly, the members of the perpetrating group all become victims or possible victims
of those same crimes (Kuper 1981, 86). Victims of genocide are targeted for the sole fact
that they are members of the victimized group (Andreopoulos 1994, 1). The victims are
denied individuality. A severe division in society is needed for such a refusal to exist.
This rift, which leads to violent ideologies and policies and a refusal of individuality, is
observed in a large portion of genocides throughout history. In reference to the early 20"
century Ottoman genocide against Turkish Armenians, Hovannisian explains that the
clearly drawn racial, religious, and cultural differences contributed to the emergence of a

genocidal policy (Hovannisian 1994, 117). As with the existence of political turmoil
within a country, this rift in society is a necessary aspect of a pre-genocidal state, but it is
not a sufficient cause of genocide.
In order for a group to be targeted for elimination, whether in whole or in part, an
ideology must emerge which undermines the group member’s status as human-beings
(Kuper1981, 84).

This ideology of dehumanization is generally intended to achieve a

larger political or social agenda (Kuper 1981, 87). Large-scale murder is still possible
without this ideology, but a failure to dehumanize the victims forces the perpetrators of
genocide to view themselves as common murders (Kuper 1981, 84). The policy of
genocide is reached only when the final ideology of dehumanization is complete.

The

two conditions that generate this ideology are a threat from the victimized group and
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vulnerability on behalf of the perpetrators (Midlarsky 2005, 4). This threat and
vulnerability may be real or imagined, but in genocidal episodes it leads to political or
social agendas that hide behind a dehumanizing ideology and motivate a genocidal
policy. These agendas find origin in the perpetrators’ need to protect their own power
and to strengthen the stability of their position (Midlarsky 2005, 4). A dehumanizing
ideology is more easily established if there exists a real or imagined threat to one’s own

power or position. As Midlarsky explains, if “physical destruction of human life is not
motivated by an existential threat to one’s own way of life, then it cannot be

justified’(Midlarsky 2005, 101).
Threat and vulnerability lead to an increased need for a state-sponsored policy
directed toward increasing the security of the state. This policy emerges in the form of

minimization of risk from a particular group and repression of that group’s current power
(Midlarsky 2005, 106). Genocidal policy, supported by proper dehumanizing ideology,
achieves both aspects of increased state security. If a group is eliminated or severely
weakened, it no longer threatens the state or the position of the perpetrating group. The
idea of vulnerability on behalf of the perpetrating group is required in order for the state
or perpetrating group to feel any true threat from the victimized group. The victims must
also be vulnerable so they can be severely weakened or eliminated by the perpetrators
(Midlarsky 2005, 4).
Another contributing factor to genocidal policy occurs when the perpetrating

group blames a victimized group for a loss. Midlarsky combines this concept of loss and
blame with the ideas of threat, vulnerability, and the desire for in increase in state

15

security. Using the term “loss compensation” he explains the rise of genocidal policy as
a response to current or recent loss (Midlarsky 2005, 141). Nazi killings of European
Jews are an example, as the Jews were blamed for the poor state of the German economy

in the period between World War I and World War II (Midlarsky 2005, 139). As the
security of Nazi Germany began to deteriorate following the German invasion of the
Soviet Union, the Jewish population was once again blamed by Nazi ideology.

This

blame led to increased violence against the Jewish population (Midlarsky 2005, 141).
In the post-colonial instances of genocide with which I am concerned, genocide
as retribution is primarily a response to crimes committed against the perpetrating group
during the era of colonization. In many of the cases the perpetrating group is not in a
state of decline, but retribution remains a vital part of the genocidal ideology directed at
the victimized group.

As decolonization concludes, the population of a former colony

often desires revenge for hardships they suffered during the colonial era. In many postcolonial occurrences of genocide, repression of the colonial political and social order,
minimization of the risk of a return to that order, and retribution for crimes committed

during the colonial era combine to create a powerful ideology. The ideology serves to
strengthen the power and position of the ruling group and to exact revenge upon the

victimized group for their elite status during the colonial period.
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Chapter 3: Indirect Colonial Rule as a Motivation of Genocide

Between the 15" and 20" centuries, Europe maintained colonial interests in much
of the world. While they are each unique in many ways, the majority of countries on the
continents of Africa, Asia, and South America share one common historical aspect: a
European colonial period.

The decision to colonize the world outside Europe can be

attributed primarily to a desire to acquire resources within the colonized countries and to
convert the colonized populations to Christianity.

The effects of this decision to colonize

are much more complex, resulting in long-lasting consequences, many disastrous.

In the

process of colonization, great hardships often plagued the colonized populations. The
violence of conquest, newly introduced disease, and slave-like conditions are just a few
examples of the hardships imposed by European colonialism.

Colonization was brutal,

and in many cases, brought little improvement to the lives of the colonized people. Many
post-colonial societies have suffered from political turmoil, violence and poverty, as
institutions introduced by the Europeans became weapons with which war was waged.

Direct and indirect colonial practices must be differentiated, as each has a unique
influence on the colonized population. As Europe began to colonize the countries of
South America, Central America, and Mexico, a direct form of colonial administration

was implemented.

Beginning in 1492 with Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the New

World, the Spanish and Portuguese governments began sponsoring exploratory voyages,

which led to an increase in the number of settlers living in the newly found land. As
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conquest became more common, the natives of the New World became subjects of
European governors (Burkholder 1990, 180-189).
In the period of history preceding the arrival of Europeans, three civilizations
dominated South America, Central America and Mexico.

The Aztecs, Incas, and Mayans

were advanced societies with their own governments, cultures, and technologies. With
the arrival of the Europeans, the populations of these civilizations all became
indistinguishably indigenous.

Social, cultural, and linguistic diversity characterized the

pre-colonial Americas, but as the Europeans furthered their conquest, this rich culture
was eventually eliminated.

This elimination of diversity began with the creation of a

common racial identity, the Indian (Burkholder 1990, 189).
Along with the terrible conditions that colonization brought to the indigenous
_ populations of the New World existed an administrative authority completely comprised
of Europeans.

The Spanish viceroys, who acted as governors in the colonized countries

were with few exceptions born and raised in Spain. The Council of the Indies, which
oversaw Spanish colonial affairs and every level of colonial government, was run
exclusively by Spaniards.

This Council was in existence from 1524 to the early 18"

century (Burkholder 1990, 72-75).
The Spanish colonial authority attempted an initial recognition of the native elites
in order to ease tension among the newly conquered populations.

Captive rulers were

used as intermediaries to the populations, but this attempted use of former elites was
unsuccessful. The last remaining captive rulers died in Spain in 1627 (Burkholder 1990,
190-191). Rather than the elevation of a minority which was common in direct rule
18

systems, a demotion of the ruling class to teaching and bureaucratic positions
characterized the direct rule of colonial Latin America.

In addition to this general

demotion of the ruling class, the Indian nobility became increasingly racially mixed as

Spaniards often married women of the top sections of the nobility (Burkholder 1990,
191). This mixing of natives with colonizers led to a nobility that was culturally Spanish.
Thus, these former elites were no longer truly indigenous. In direct rule societies in the
Americas, colonization created a rift between the colonizers and the colonized indigenous

population.
Unlike the direct colonial rule of the Americas, the indirect colonial rule common
to Africa and Asia created a rift between indigenous groups. The use of indirect rule in
African colonies was much greater than in the Americas for several reasons. Much of
Africa was not easily reached by Europeans. The continent has little seacoast in
comparison to its massive area and African rivers are generally unnavigable by large
vessels which made early voyages into the continent impossible by boat. Mountain
ranges and hill systems run parallel to much of the African coastline, providing another
barrier to European ventures into the more central parts of the continent (Hoskins 1930,
3-4). Prior to 1870, European possessions in Africa were characterized by seaports and
fortified trading posts (Hoskins 1930, 32). It was not until 1877 that the primary features
(natural resources and landmarks) of the entire continent were roughly established
(Hoskins 1930, 37). Even after Europeans had a strengthened knowledge of Africa, a

large scale immigration of Europeans to Africa was still not plausible. In the era of
colonization, Europeans had no desire to migrate to the African continent (Hoskins 1930,
1

102).

Though the land was rich in resources, much of the continent maintained climates

and terrains unsuitable to European populations.
As a result of the impossibility of a widespread European immigration to Africa,
indirect rule was implemented.

Though direct rule was the initial form of colonial

authority in Africa, the shift to indirect rule was eventually undergone by all the
European colonial authorities (Mamdani 2001, 24-25).

In this form of colonial

administration, the European colonizers promoted native allies which they could rely on
to positions of authority with little consideration given to traditional “rights of
rulership” (Ajayi 2000, 188). European colonizers needed order among the colonized
population.

An orderly colony was most easily achieved by maintaining the traditional

institutions of the colonized country, while filling the positions of authority with people
that could be influenced and controlled.

The colonial authorities did not truly wish to

legitimize the changes they brought to Africa, but simply to force Africans to accept their
influence and control.

To the Europeans, both in colonial and domestic settings, the

authority imposed on African populations was justified by the imagined racial, cultural,
moral, technological, and intellectual superiority which they possessed over the colonized
populations of Africa (Ajayi 2000, 188-189).
Indirect rule was not unique to the African continent; this form of colonial
administration also characterized much of colonial Asia.

In Indonesia, the Dutch

exploited divisions within the population in order to strengthen their own authority; the
Dutch also elevated the elites of Indonesia to a status “beyond traditional limits” and
created within the elites a group structured to serve the colonial government (Kingsbury
20

1998, 30). Indirect rule was also used in India by the British East India Company and the
British government.

Though subordinate to British parliament, Indian elites held

positions of authority throughout the country. An “India Secretary,” advised by an “India
Council”, collaborated with the British viceroy in matters of legislation (von Albertini

1982, 14). Thus, colonial India was developed with the help of Indian elites. The British
were also aided in colonial India by an “intermediary Indian class,” members of which
acted as district officers. These Indian officers provided the British authority with
information collected from the villages and subordinates in their districts (von Albertini
1982, 16). By 1939, almost half of the Indian Civil Service was filled by Indians (Kumar

1998, 234-235).
In a direct form of colonial rule there is a division between colonized natives and
the foreign colonizers. This division may lead to a struggle against the colonial
authority— a struggle where the indigenous population aligns itself along racial lines due
to the racial basis of the division between colonized and colonizer.

With much of the

colonial administration of an indirect rule colony filled by members of an indigenous
group, the population was divided.

A colonially elevated group was constructed by

indirect colonial rule, allowing for an official separation between different indigenous
groups. The native, colonized population was divided along lines of ethnicity. While

there was still a rift between colonized and colonizer, the indigenous population could no
longer unite against the colonial authority due to its own ethnic divisions (Mamdani

2001).
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Indirect rule was still a form of colonization, regardless of the amount of de facto

authority allowed to the native population. The section of society which was elevated to
the position of authority acted only in the interest of the colonizing country. They were
not autonomous rulers, nor were they always the traditional ruling class. Indirect rule
created a division, sometimes hostile, between the chosen native elites and the section of

society over which these elites possessed de facto authority. This division often became
a source of hate and violence during the years of decolonization and the period which
followed independence.

In some of these former colonies, genocide emerged as a

technique to solidify the current power of the ruling majority and punish the minority
which had ruled during the colonial period.
Twenty-six of the thirty-two countries which have experienced genocide since
1943 are former colonies. The overwhelming majority of former colonies in the list of
genocidal episodes must lead us to consider a possible link between colonization and
genocide. Do colonization and the temporary or permanent effects of colonization lead a
country to a greater degree of susceptibility toward genocide? As I have explained, strong
divisions within a country’s society must exist in order for genocide to occur. Formerly
colonized countries often possess rifts within their societies which were implemented or
influenced by the European colonial process.

During indirect colonial rule, colonial

authorities created an unnatural pluralism within these former colonies in which one
section of society was elevated to a privileged, elite status. I will call this first elite
section of society the colonially elevated group.
to a condition of second-class citizenship.

Another section of society was relegated

In some cases, this second group was
22

-_

completely denied citizenship. I call this section of colonial society the colonially
relegated group.
This separation of society, which can be seen in the manipulation of existent

divisions or in the European invention of divisions, was a result of the colonizing state’s
desire to control the colonized population without dedicating the manpower and
administration to a direct rule of the country.

The elevated section of the colonized

society was held as a ruling class and given almost complete control over the country,
although their authority was generally granted by the European colonizing government.
A minority group was often chosen for this privileged status, as the small population
numbers of a minority can be more easily controlled and manipulated. The colonially
elevated class, in some cases, was imagined by the colonial authority to be nonindigenous to the country, previously migrating to the country, and therefore in
possession of a natural right to rule over the indigenous population. The invented right to
rule provided to the elite section of society seems to be a result of the colonial-era
Europeans’ belief that the colonized populations were heathens, unfit for selfgovernment.

In some instances, the elite group may have actually been foreign. This

was true in many of the Latin American countries, as a more direct system of colonial
tule was used to control these populations.

If it is true that the colonial process creates

and strengthens divisions within society, it can be established that a condition that
encourages genocide, a deep rift within society, was often produced in colonies by
colonial authorities.
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While a divided society is vital to the occurrence of genocide, it is not a sufficient
cause. An ideology must also emerge which creates the possibility for genocidal policy.
Three ideas discussed in chapter two must be recalled here: the minimization of the risk
of return to a former, oppressive social and governmental order; the repression of any
remaining institutions or members of the former order; and a retribution for crimes
committed against those currently in power during the time of the former order. These
are three foundations for an ideology that provokes genocidal policy. The pluralism of
inequality introduced or strengthened by the colonial process provides these three
motivations and has the potential to produce a genocidal ideology. This unequal
pluralism is invented or manipulated and is rarely influenced by an actual division (at
least not one equal in strength to those introduced by colonial authorities) existent in precolonial society. In many cases, the colonially relegated group was demoted from a
relatively equal status within the society to a position of second-class citizenship over the
course of only a few decades. After decolonization, the colonially relegated group
acquires control of the country through violent or non-violent means.

Once the colonially

relegated group is in power, it may feel a need to repress the former order and to
minimize the risk of a return to the colonial order.
The issues of vulnerability and threat must also be recalled at this point. In order
for a genocidal policy to be justified, the perpetrating group must feel a certain level of
vulnerability and a threat from the colonially elevated group. The fact that the colonially

relegated group is demoted to a lower-class existence within society during colonization
allows for feelings of vulnerability. The historically proven idea that at any moment the
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majority group may once again be relegated to the bottom of society leads to the embrace

of repressive and risk-minimizing motivations. If the formerly elite minority is
eliminated, the current ruling class strengthens its power, and minimizes the risk of a
return to its status under colonial rule. The colonial elite, often a minority group, suffers
strong vulnerability due to its lack of quantitative strength. The current ruling class is
aware of this vulnerability.

The consequences, such as violent reprisals or casualties

from a strong defense, of attempting to eliminate a segment of society are greatly
diminished as the vulnerability of that segment increases.
The motivation of retribution for crimes committed during the colonial period is
also embraced by the post-colonial ruling class. The hostility felt by the new elite class is
exacerbated by the invented or manipulated alien status of the colonial elites. The period
of this alien elite’s rule is seen as a time of foreign occupation and the oppression under
which the majority suffered is seen as a crime committed by a group of invaders or an
occupying force. Retribution against the actual invaders, the European colonial
authorities, is not a plausible option, so revenge is enacted upon the pawns of the colonial
administration.
The three motivations of genocide (repression, risk-minimization, and retribution)
must be viewed in the post-colonial context. The colonial authority is ousted, often
leaving behind a strong nationalist movement.

The colonially elevated group becomes

the target of nationalism after decolonization. The emotions and ideology of nationalism
lead to a desire, especially on the part of the colonially relegated, to repress all remnants
of the colonial authority, minimize risk of a return to the colonial order, and seek
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retribution for colonial oppression.

The lack of protection from the former colonial

authority allows this nationalism to emerge in violence, even genocide, against the

colonially elevated group.
The susceptibility to genocide of societies with a history of indirect colonial rule
is evidenced by the list of post-colonial occurrences of genocide.

Of the twenty-six

former colonies which have experienced genocide, nineteen possess some history of
indirect rule, while only seven are former direct rule colonies.

Some of the colonial

periods of these countries were dominated by direct rule, but did experience periods of
indirect rule. Table 1 on page fifty-six shows the breakdown of the types of colonial rule
experienced by the thirty-two post-colonial genocidal countries.
Countries with a history of indirect colonial rule are more likely to experience
genocide than countries with no colonial history or with a history of direct colonial rule.
Indirect colonization often divided the populations of colonies into colonially elevated
and colonially relegated groups.

The colonially elevated section of society was given

elite status and special privileges.

This group also ruled or governed the country on

behalf of the colonial authority.

The colonially relegated section of society was

oppressed and demoted to an inferior citizenship. After decolonization, if the colonially
relegated group gains power it often seeks a violent policy against the colonially elevated
group. This policy is motivated by three ideologies: the minimization of the risk of a
return to the colonial order, repression of the colonially elevated group, and a retribution
for the oppression which the colonially relegated group suffered during the colonial
period. The motivating ideologies possess varying levels of strength in different
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Chapter 4: Case Study: Rwanda

Beginning in the

final years of Belgian colonial rule, Rwanda was plagued by

ce and hardship
. conflict The conflict between Tutsi and Hutu has inflicted violen
,
ethnic

on

the victims. The ethnic
the population of Rwanda, and the Tutsi have most often been

against Tutsi.
inated in 1994 with one hundred days of violence
culm
da
Rwan
in
nflict
co
, along with their Hutu sympathizers,
This state-sponsored genocide targeted all Tutsi
Killing approximately 800,000 Rwandans.

What motivated this horrific instance of

is extreme social division. The
directed violence? The simple answer to this question
the other that the
pursuits of each ethnic group had become so contrary to those of
on.
division warranted a body count close to one milli
It would seem that genocide results from years of ethnic fractionalization, but this

isnot true of Rwanda. The violent division is a relatively new aspect of Rwandan
society, largely implemented by the Belgian colonial authority.
recognized, even by Rwandans.

The division is not easily

Often, ethnicity in Rwanda is only signified by a

government issued identity card. The ethnic division in Rwanda is not based on an
ancient difference of culture, religion, or ancestry. This division is based on the
relatively recent manipulation of the Rwandan population by colonial authorities.
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Pre-colonial Rwanda
Before the arrival of European colonizers in Rwanda, a distinction between Tutsi

and Hutu existed, but was not as acute as that of the post-colonial era. The monarchy of
pre-colonial Rwanda was traditionally Tutsi. This dominance of the kingship by Tutsi
was considered a sacred right. Rwandan mythology imagines three sons of God, Gatwa,
Gahutu, and Gatutsi, representing the three distinctions of Rwandan society, the Twa,
Tutsi, and Hutu.

In one myth, God tests his sons by entrusting each with a container of

milk. Both Gatwa and Gahutu fail the test, drinking and spilling the milk respectively.
Gatutsi maintains his milk and is given authority over his brothers and over Rwanda by
his divine father (Mamdani 2001, 79). Along with the monarchy, the Tutsi population of
pre-colonial Rwanda dominated a patron-client system. This was a system of inequality,
but as it existed in early Rwandan history, the system can be most closely compared to a
“modem protection racket”(Mamdani 2001, 65). The system, until the early 19" century,
was one of reciprocal benefits for Tutsi and Hutu. Hutu gained protection from their
Tutsi patrons and Tutsi benefitted from occasional gifts from their Hutu clients (Mamdani
2001, 65).
I want to emphasize three aspects of the early domination of Rwandan society by
Tutsi. First, this domination was considered divine in nature, not just by Tutsi, but also
by Hutu. Second, in the case of the patron-client system, the relationship between Tutsi
and Hutu was considered to be one of reciprocity. The term patron accurately signifies
this reciprocity — an “I’1l scratch your back if you scratch mine” attitude was at the core
of this system. The third aspect of the pre-colonial relationship between Tutsi and Hutu
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is that of brotherhood.
as brother forces.

In the mythology of Rwanda, Tutsi and Hutu are always imagined

Though the Tutsi brother is chosen by God to rule, the Hutu brother

does not rebel against this divine allowance of authority.

Indeed, prior to the arrival of

European colonizers to Rwanda, there was no memory of systematic violence between
Tutsi and Hutu (Prunier 1994, 39).

Though the Tutsi did occupy the primary positions of authority in pre-colonial
Rwanda, the Hutu were not without power.

While the Mwami, or king, of Rwanda was

the ultimate authority, three types of chiefs ruled under the king. The “chief of
landholdings”, “chief of men”, and “chief of the pastures” were not solely Tutsi (Prunier

1994, 11). In fact, a large number of “chiefs of landholdings” were Hutu (Prunier 1994,
12). This share of chieftain positions signifies the position of pre-colonial Hutu. They
were not the dominant ruling class, but the Hutu were not completely relegated in the
Rwandan political arena. The fact that there were no severe instances of violence
between Hutu and Tutsi before colonization is evidence that the unequal system of
power-sharing in Rwanda was accepted.

It can be concluded that the system functioned

smoothly for an era with beginnings predating the collective memory of the Rwandan
population upon colonization.
While a political division existed in Rwanda prior to colonization, Hutu and Tutsi
were culturally unified. Banyarwanda was the primary cultural identity of Rwanda, an

identity comprised of both Hutu and Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 36). For centuries, Hutu and
Tutsi lived side by side and commonly intermarried, creating a single cultural identity.
The two groups shared a common language, Kinyarwanda (Mamdani 2001, 74). Hutu
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and Tutsi also recognized mutual kin groups.

Members of the inzu, or lineage, shared a

common ancestor four or five generations back.
Tutsi (Mamdani 2001, 54-55).

The inzu did not include both Hutu and

The ubwoko, or clan, did include members of both ethnic

goups. This kin group was the largest and was comprised of different Hutu and Tutsi
lineages which shared a common ancestor many generations back (Mamdani 2001, 54).
Though this large kin group had little influence on its members’ lives, it points to the fact
that Hutu and Tutsi recognized a brotherhood, similar to the one conveyed by Rwandan
mythology. This recognition is not rare, as all eighteen major clans in Rwanda included
both Tutsi and Hutu (Mamdani 2001, 54).
Pre-colonial Rwanda also possessed unity in the religious realm. The Kubandwa
cult of Rwanda was believed to be of Hutu origin and was largely led by Hutu.
Ceremonies were generally performed by Hutu, but the cult’s following was comprised
of both Hutu and Tutsi (Prunier 1994, 15). While the Tutsi controlled much of political
life, the Hutu dominated the leadership of the “supernatural” life of pre-colonial Rwanda.
The two areas were associated with one another; a mutual agreement existed between the
two groups that each area of life was dependant on the other (Mamdani 2001, 64).
Religious unity acted as another form of social cohesion, allowing Hutu and Tutsi to
coexist in harmony.

Though large-scale violence between Hutu and Tutsi was non-existent in precolonial Rwanda, war was common in the early history of the country. War was
commonly used as a means to conquer, protect the kingdom, and to steal cattle from nonRwandan neighbors (Prunier 1994, 14). The positions of leadership in the Rwandan
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military were filled by Tutsi, but all men of Rwanda were active in military roles. The

Hutu were respected as warriors, primarily due to their efficiency on the battlefield
(Prunier 1994, 15). In war, Tutsi and Hutu considered themselves Banyarwanda who

faced a common enemy in the interest of the state (Prunier 1994, 15). The ranks were
unequally weighted to Tutsi advantage, but this was accepted, similar to the acceptance

of Tutsi control of the political sphere. Hutu warriors were often rewarded by their Tutsi
leaders for their achievements in battle; the cohesion of the military benefitted both Hutu
and Tutsi and existed for centuries (Prunier 1994, 14). Pre-colonial Rwandan society was
unified, with Hutu and Tutsi sharing a mutually beneficial relationship. Though the
power in this relationship was unequally distributed, the distribution was accepted and
Hutu and Tutsi lived harmoniously for centuries. I attribute the cohesion of Hutu and
Tutsi to the fact that the relationship between the two groups was traditional. Power was
not given to the Tutsi, they had possessed authority for as long as the population could

collectively remember.

Also, the power was not total and it was not unfair. Hutu

maintained some positions of authority and were generally respected by the Tutsi
population. The authority of the Tutsi was not oppressive. Though the identities of Hutu
and Tutsi existed, they were often blurred, as much of the population intermarried. In
many areas of life, Hutu and Tutsi were simply Banyarwanda, sharing a common cultural

community.
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Colonization

Rwandan society maintained a level of unity, though unequal, which allowed its
members to live peacefully for centuries before the arrival of European colonizers.

Indirect colonization destroyed this unity, replacing it with a system which strictly
polarized Hutu and Tutsi.

In the years immediately preceding colonization, the Rwandan

monarchy had begun to centralize its kingdom.

Prior to this centralizing movement,

several Hutu principalities existed in Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 17). The monarchy
intended these independent principalities to become part of its kingdom.

German

colonizers arrived in Rwanda in 1897 and implemented a system of indirect colonial rule.

This system allowed and encouraged the monarchy to continue its centralizing movement
and aided the movement by directly controlling certain areas with or on behalf of the

monarchy. The German colonial authority also enlisted and supported Tutsi chiefs to
control areas which, due to a lack of manpower, they could not control themselves
(Prunier 1994, 25). This is one of the earliest examples of a colonial authority giving
new power to Tutsi in order to indirectly control Rwanda.

German colonial rule in

Rwanda was short, ending in 1916, and did not severely influence Rwandan society. The
Belgians then assumed colonial authority in Rwanda.
Belgium forcibly took control of Rwanda in 1916, but the new colonial authority
waited until 1926 to implement any real colonial policy. The Belgian authority viewed
the Tutsi in terms of a “migration hypothesis” and the European opinion that only nonindigenous groups were capable of ruling Africa (Mamdani 2001, 43). Their belief was
primarily influenced by the “elongation of physical features” of the Tutsi population
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(Mamdani 2001, 47).

The Belgians believed that at some point, the Tutsi population

migrated to Africa, and thus were of European or Caucasian ancestry.

In fact, wherever

an organized state existed, European colonizers assumed that the ruling class originated
from a foreign source (Mamdani 2001, 80). The Belgian colonial authority used their

beliefs on Tutsi origin to justify a Tutsi right to rule. In this justification the Belgians
neglected the fact that Hutu and Tutsi had shared a cultural community for a span of time
which reached beyond the collective memory of the population.
As European colonizers overlooked certain unifying factors in Rwanda, their
beliefs led to the racialization of Rwandan society. The Tutsi of Rwanda were seen as
superior group, especially in relation to the Hutu population. The Catholic church, which
was the Belgian authority’s partner in colonization, viewed the Tutsi as “superb
humans”(Mamdani 2001, 87). In 1917, a church official in Rwanda wrote that “a Tutsi
was a European under a black skin’”(Mamdani 2001, 88). The Catholic church and the
: Belgian colonial authority created an ideology which racialized the differences between
Hutu and Tutsi and elevated the Tutsi population to a superior status in all realms of life.
The Belgians completed an “ideological reconstruction of Rwanda’s past and, from the

artificial past, of the present’(Prunier 1994, 36). This ideology drove the colonial policy,
which completely elevated Tutsi while relegating the Hutu population. The ideology also
was a source of hate for the Hutu population, as the Tutsi were hailed as an inherently

superior class which had migrated from a foreign region. European ideology began the
process of dismantling the pre-colonial unity between Tutsi and Hutu.

institutional policy completed this process.
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The Catholic church and the

Belgian colonial authority created an ideology which racialized the differences between

Hutu and Tutsi and elevated the Tutsi population to a superior status in all realms of life.
The Belgians completed an “ideological reconstruction of Rwanda’s past and, from the
artificial past, of the present’(Prunier 1994, 36). This ideology drove the colonial policy,
which completely elevated Tutsi while relegating the Hutu population.

The ideology also

was a source of hate for the Hutu population, as the Tutsi were hailed as an inherently
superior class which had migrated from a foreign region. European ideology began the
process of dismantling the pre-colonial unity between Tutsi and Hutu. Colonial
institutional policy completed this process.
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In order to create an elite that was capable of acting as a surrogate ruling class for
the colonial authority, the Belgians constructed a system of education which greatly
separated Hutu and Tutsi.

From an early age Tutsi were taught their elevated role in

society and Hutu were taught they were inferior to the Tutsi. In this indirect system of

colonial rule, the Belgians created a class of people which would act as their pawns in
Rwanda.

This system of education also served to polarize the two segments of the

population, further destroying the unity which had existed in pre-colonial Rwanda.
If the Tutsi children educated by the Belgian authority and Catholic missionaries

transformed into one institutionally dominated by Tutsi. The system which had existed

—

were to be the ruling class of Rwanda, the system of rule in the colony had to be

before colonization was dominated by Tutsi, but Hutu maintained a share of power. The

\

institutional changes implemented by the Belgians erased the idea of shared power and

i

mutually beneficial relationships. In 1929, the traditional three-chief system was

abolished and the three former positions were merged into one (Prunier 1994, 27).
Formerly, one of the positions had been largely held by Hutu, which allowed for a

balance of power among the chiefs (Mamdani 2001, 91). This balance of power was lost
in the 1929, as the single chieftain position was given completely to Tutsi (Mamdani
2001, 91). The central power and local power of Rwanda was put solely into the hands
of the Tutsi population.
The power of the Tutsi population over the Rwandan Hutu was increased by the
creation of the Native Tribunals. Completely comprised of Tutsi chiefs, this 1936 reform

added judicial power to the executive and legislative powers which the chiefs already
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held (Mamdani 2001, 91-92). During the years of colonial implementation of
institutional reform in Rwanda, the monarchy was weakened by the Belgian authority.
As this occurred the power of the country was given to the local chiefs. The authority of
the Tutsi chiefs became increasingly despotic, as the elites took full advantage of the
compete authority which the Belgian authority had given them (Mamdani 2001, 91).
The patron-client system of pre-colonial Rwanda was greatly altered during
colonial rule. While the pre-colonial system had been beneficial to both sides of the
agreement, under Belgian control the system was changed into one which oppressed the
Hutu and benefitted the Tutsi. The system was also spread to areas of the country which
had previously not known it. In these cases the system began to be seen as a colonial
invention which Tutsi used for their own benefit. Even where the system had previously
existed, it was resented due to its increased benefit for Tutsi and decreased advantage for
Hutu (Prunier 1994, 30).

The influence of the Catholic church on Tutsi-Hutu relations is apparent in its role
in the discriminatory education system and its promotion of an ideology which imagined
Tutsi to be superior to Hutu. The Catholic church also destroyed, or at least severely

weakened, the Kubandwa cult. This early religion was an important institution for precolonial social cohesion, but as colonial influence increased, the influence of the Catholic

church also strengthened.

Kubandwa was characterized by dual Hutu-Tutsi membership,

which provided social cohesion.

The cult was also an indigenous religion with little

political influence. Catholic converts were often only converts because they were forced

into conversion by a fear of losing their positions of authorities or a desire to be allied
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with the colonial authority. Catholicism failed to replace Kubandwa as a tool of social
cohesion because it was dominated by Tutsi and its converts often lacked true religious
devotion on which common ground could be found. Also, the religion was a foreign

institution, so it was not respected as an institution in which Tutsi and Hutu could equally
coexist. No other Belgian institutions provided such coexistence, so why would
Catholicism? It is important to recall that the Kubandwa cult had been led by Hutu.
Once again a pre-colonial unifying institution was destroyed and the Hutu population lost
one of its former sources of authority.
The final dividing institution which the Belgian authority imposed on Rwandan
society was a system of identity cards which labeled each individual as Hutu, Tutsi, or
Twa (a quantitatively insignificant Rwandan minority). An official census was
undertaken by the Belgian authority from 1933 to 1934. Upon completion of this census,
each Rwandese individual was officially distinguished as a Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa.

The

distinction was imposed using information from the church, physical features and
measurements, and ownership of large numbers of cattle (a traditional Tutsi
characteristic), in order to decide who belonged to each group (Mamdani 2001, 99).
Prior to colonization, Hutu and Tutsi had existed as separate groups which were often
indistinguishable due to intermarriage.

The two groups possessed different

responsibilities, such as government for Tutsi and religious leadership for Hutu. Hutu
and Tutsi shared a common cultural identity and common interests. The common

interests of the two groups are evidenced by their cooperation in military and religious
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pursuits. The Belgian authority erased all that was common between Hutu and Tutsi and

placed them in officially documented and identifiable groups (i.e. identity cards).
During colonization, the Tutsi population of Rwanda was given complete political
control of the country, the religion which had formerly bonded Hutu and Tutsi was
destroyed, Hutu were forced into unfair economic relationships, colonial ideology

imagined the Tutsi population as superior to Hutu, and the population which had
coexisted peacefully prior to colonization was increasingly divided by Belgianintroduced institutions. Hutu were told that they were inferior to Tutsi and that they
“deserved their fate” of being “deprived of all political power and materially exploited by
both the whites and the Tutsi” (Prunier 1994, 39). These aspects of colonial Rwanda
planted a Hutu ideology of hate for all Tutsi (Prunier 1994, 39). This ideology of hate
grew and eventually emerged as genocide against the Tutsi population.

Decolonization and the Years Leading to Genocide
Throughout Rwanda’s colonial period, the minority Tutsi had remained in a
position of absolute authority. As Rwanda began to move toward independence from
Belgium and an autonomous, democratically elected government, the Hutu majority
inevitably took its position as the new ruling class. Even before independence, Belgium
began to show favor to the Hutu majority, whom they had formerly relegated and
oppressed.

In November of 1959, a Hutu activist was attacked by a group of young Tutsi

men, leading to violent reprisals against Tutsi throughout the country.

As Hutu burned

the homes of Tutsi, the Belgian authorities refused to intervene (Prunier 1994, 49)
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Beginning in the early 1960s, the Belgian authority in Rwanda began to replace the
predominantly Tutsi chiefs throughout the country with Hutu chiefs (Prunier 1994, 51).
The shift of policy enacted by the Belgian authority was an obvious attempt to secure a
positive relationship with the Hutu majority, as they would become the ruling class once
the country democratized.

In 1960, communal elections were held in Rwanda, with the

Hutu parties winning 210 of the 229 communal authority positions. The Party for Hutu
Emancipation, or PARMEHUTU,

won 160 of the total positions.

During the emergence of the Hutu majority as the ruling class of Rwanda, Tutsi
were increasingly persecuted.

By late 1963, 130,000 Tutsi had fled to the Belgian

Congo, Burundi, Tanganyika, and Uganda.

In a total population of just 2.7 million, this

led to an ever-widening quantitative gap between the Tutsi minority and the Hutu
majority (Prunier 1994, 51-52).

On September 25, 1961, legislative elections were held

in Rwanda, with the Hutu party PARMEHUTU winning seventy-eight percent of the
vote. The party now possessed thirty-five of the forty-four seats in the new legislative
body of Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 53). Between the years of 1959 and 1966, the primary

period of decolonization, violence against Tutsi in Rwanda was severe for which Hutu
leaders were not punished. The violence continued until the 1994 genocide.
As the Hutu became secure in their position of authority, violence against Tutsi
consistently occurred.

It is estimated that between 1960 and 1990, six hundred to seven

hundred thousand Tutsi fled or were forced to leave Rwanda (Prunier 1994, 63). The

early violence against Tutsi was primarily retribution against and repression of the old
order. After years of oppression at the hands of the colonial Belgians and their Tutsi
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stooges, the Hutu suddenly held complete power over the country.

In order to secure this

power, the Hutu government encouraged violence against Tutsi. This violence was
readily accepted by the Hutu population due to the ideology of hate against Tutsi which
had matured and strengthened during colonization.

The Tutsi became scapegoats for the

oppression which the Hutu suffered during colonization (Cretien 2003, 305).

While

retribution and repression were strong forces in the years following decolonization, riskminimization had not yet emerged.
Gregoire Kayibanda, the president of Rwanda’s First Republic, which began in

1962, transformed Rwanda into a Hutu state. All political activity was limited to the
Hutu population.

The Belgian authority had created a migration ideology which

imagined the Tutsi population as foreign.

“The First Republic considered this claim

reason enough to treat them [Tutsi] as politically illegitimate’(Mamdani 2001, 134). The
First Republic ended on July 5, 1973 when Major General Juvenal Habyariman led a
non-violent coup against the current regime, beginning the Second Republic (Mamdani
2001, 138). The Second Republic introduced a more systematic system of retribution,
though it was an institutional retribution rather than a violent one. In order to “redress
historical wrongdoings’, the Second Republic imposed quotas on Tutsi dominated
institutions. The education, employment, and religious sectors of Rwanda were forced to
maintain a percentage of Hutu which matched the Hutu percentage of the population.
This “affirmative action program” was intended as a way in which the Hutu population
could be compensated for their oppression during the colonial period. However, the
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program also served as a repressive tool, as countless Tutsi were forced into
unemployment (Mamdani 2001, 138-150).
The years of the Second Republic were generally peaceful, though life was often
difficult for the Tutsi population. Habyarimana imposed a single party political system,
in which the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement, or MRND,

was the sole party. Habyarimana also introduced “peace and stability” to Rwanda
(Prunier 1994, 76). Tutsi faced discrimination and were largely excluded from the
military and the political sphere (Prunier 1994, 75), but enjoyed certain rights within
society (Mamdani 2001, 140). I see the relative peace of this period as a result of the
completion of retribution and repression.

The Tutsi order had been repressed. Revenge

for past oppression had been taken on the Tutsi population, both through political and
violent means.

However, in the early 1990s, the ideologies of repression and retribution

would be awakened by the ideology of risk-minimization.
In October of 1990, a force of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a Tutsi rebel
army, invaded Rwanda.

The initial invasion failed, ignited a civil war that lasted four

years. While the RPF was small and militarily weak in October of 1990, its strength

grew throughout the civil war (Mamdani 2001, 186). Civil war endangered the Hutu
authority. During the civil war, Hutu were reminded by their leaders of the horrible
oppression which they had suffered during the colonial period of Tutsi elevation.
Propagandists explained that an RPF victory would result in an immediate return to the

colonial order, in which Tutsi had been elevated to complete dominance over Hutu. The
colonial migration hypothesis was reenforced throughout the civil war. The Tutsi were
4]

portrayed as foreign invaders who had formerly led an oppressive order and would
reconstruct that order in the event of a RPF victory (Mamdani 2001, 190-191). The Hutu
of Rwanda feared any allowance of authority to the Tutsi population. The Hutu
population had suffered almost sixty years of complete Tutsi dominance during the
colonial period, so it is not surprising that they were willing to use genocide in order to
maintain their post-colonial power.
Peace talks held in Arusha, Tanzania in July of 1992 offer a perspective on the
perceived risk of a return to the Tutsi dominated colonial order. The final agreement
gave Tutsi charge of the Ministry of the Interior, forty percent of enlisted positions in the
army, fifty percent of the officer position in the army, and guarantee of the peaceful
return of all Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.

The peace talks were seen by many Hutu as an

agreement between the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its internal Hutu accomplices
(Mamdani 2001, 210). At this point, the authority and comfort which the Hutu
population had enjoyed since decolonization were decisively endangered.

Hutu media

and leaders used these talks to mobilize the ideology of retribution, repression, and riskminimization into a genocidal policy, which emerged in the horrific 1994 genocide.
In 1994, the colonially relegated Hutu attempted to minimize risk by eliminating
the colonially elevated Tutsi. During the sixty years of colonial rule, the Hutu population
suffered under an oppressive Tutsi dominance of society and government. The
dominance was implemented by the colonial authority and created a deep rift between the
Tutsi and Hutu populations that was not present prior to colonization. Colonial ideology
elevated Tutsi to a status of privilege and superiority. Hutu were told that they were
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relegated because they were an inferior population.

Although the Hutu population gained

power after decolonization, in 1994 was threatened by the rising political power of the
Tutsi population.

In order to maintain power, the Hutu leadership incited the Hutu

population to genocide against the Tutsi population.
The Hutu ruling elite used propaganda to incite the Hutu peasantry to a hate and
fear of Tutsi. This was accomplished during the civil war, and was a vital aspect of the
1994 genocide. Propaganda reminded the common Hutu of colonial oppression and of
the Tutsi participation in the colonial order. The ruling elite were minimizing the risk of
a loss of power and common Hutu were minimizing the risk of a return to Tutsi rule. The
move toward genocide was engineered by the Hutu elite, but was accepted by the Hutu
population due to the existence of three factors. The first factor was the renewed
ideology of hate for Tutsi which had been planted by colonization, which led to a
continued desire for retribution against the Tutsi population. The second factor was the
propagandized need to further repress the Tutsi order. The third factor, also dependent on
propaganda, was the instilment of fear of a return to the oppressive colonial order into the
Hutu population, thus creating the imagined need to minimize a risk of this return.
The 1994 Rwandan genocide consisted of a colonially relegated group attempting
to destroy a colonially elevated group. Indirect colonization implemented the necessary
social division within Rwanda for genocide to occur. The division was created and
manipulated by the colonial authority in order to adequately serve its own interests. This
invented and manipulated division produced a hate for the Tutsi population and a fear of
the oppressive order which the Tutsi had led. Prior to colonization there had been little
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yjolence between Tutsi and Hutu. Colonization polarized the two groups, providing a
motivation for genocide.

In 1994, the need for risk-minimization emerged and the Hutu

leadership used the motivations of retribution, repression, and risk-minimization to drive
the Hutu population to pursue genocide.
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Chapter 5: Case Study: Cambodia
The Genocide

In April 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea, known as the Khmer Rouge,
took complete control of Cambodia, beginning with the country’s capital and urban
center, Phnom Penh.

The period of CPK control that followed fostered one of the worst

instances of genocide of the twentieth century. The killing of between 1.5 and 2 million
people by the Khmer Rouge is normally considered politicide because the victims were
seen as enemies of the Communist revolution and “what was likely the world’s most
radical political, social, and economic revolution’(Kiernan 1994, 191). I see the killings
as a clear example of genocide, as religious and ethnic groups were specifically targeted.
Whatever term is used, the massacre was horrendous, destroying a quarter of the
Cambodia’s total population (Kiernan 1994, 191). The killings in Cambodia can be
credited to the Khmer Rouge’s desire to eradicate all classes which posed a threat to the
imposition of Communism and to the Communist regime. Though there is basic truth in
this statement, I see the genocide as a result of ulterior motives held by the peasant
dominated Khmer Rouge forces. French colonial rule altered Cambodia, and the changes
imposed by colonization had a strong influence on the Cambodian genocide.
The victims of the Cambodian genocide came from a wide array of various
segments of the population.

Unlike the Rwandan genocide, the victim-perpetrator

relationship is not easily specified. In Rwanda, the victims were primarily Tutsi, but in
Cambodia the victims were urban, rural, indigenous, and non-indigenous.

However, a

large number of the victims were urban dwellers and people with foreign ancestry. The
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victimized population is divided into two distinctions, “new people” and “base
people”’(Kiernan 1994, 192).

While areas of each distinction were targeted, the

percentages of members of each distinction that perished are evidence of the goals of the
perpetrators. This goal was the destruction of all remnants of the colonial order.
Total death counts and counts of the victimized from each segment of society
vary among experts on the genocide.

According to Kiernan’s (1994) calculations of the

1.5 million total death count, twenty-nine percent of Cambodia’s “new people” were
killed. “New people” included urban Khmer, rural Khmer, urban Chinese, urban
Vietnamese, and rural Lao.

A much lower percentage of Cambodia’s “base people” were

victimized. Sixteen percent of this group was killed, including another section of rural
Khmer, rural Cham, rural Vietnamese, rural Thai, and upland minorities (Kiernan 1994,
193). The Khmer people belong to an ethnic group which is common throughout SouthEast Asia, and comprised the majority of the Cambodian population.

The segments of

Cambodian population which owe their demise to the French indirect colonial rule are all
the victimized urban dwellers and the victimized minorities, especially the Vietnamese
and Chinese.

I will not attempt to explain the motivations behind the massacre of rural

Khmer, though a large portion of this group was killed.
In April 1975, as the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia, the first step of the
genocide began.

The cities of Cambodia were emptied, their inhabitants forced into the

countryside where they starved to death, were deported to work camps where they
eventually died, or were executed by the Khmer Rouge.

Approximately one third of

Cambodia’s urban population was destroyed during the genocide.
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The second target was

the minority population of Cambodia.

Foreign and minority languages were outlawed, an

attempt to destroy the culture of the minority population and make its continued existence
difficult Kiernan 1994, 191). The Vietnamese population of Cambodia was completely
destroyed through forced emigration or execution.

Cambodia’s Chinese population was

also severely damaged; fifty percent of the population perished during the genocide.
Along with the Chinese language, Chinese culture was also prohibited, essentially
destroying the life of this minority (Kiernan 1994, 198-199).
Due to the wide array of victimized groups, I will focus on the urban, Chinese,
and Vietnamese populations targeted during the genocide. The destruction of these three
groups provides the best explanation of the link between indirect colonial rule and
genocide. Though the Cambodian genocide was carried out in a revolutionary disguise,
the eradication of one-third of the urban population, half of the Chinese population, and
the total Vietnamese population require a deeper consideration.

These killings were not

simply the result of a Communist revolution, but were the result of fifty years of
colonially imposed oppression and social division. The victims of the colonial
oppression were the rural peasants, which I will consider the colonially relegated group.
The beneficiaries of French colonial rule, and thus the country’s colonially elevated
group, were the urban, Chinese, and Vietnamese populations.

Similar to the Rwandan

case, the Cambodian genocide was carried out by the colonially relegated group against
the colonially elevated segment of the population.
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Pre-colonization
Prior to French colonization, Cambodia was a rural, peasant based society. The

largest pre-colonial city was Phnom Penh, which supported less than twenty-five
thousand inhabitants. In a distant second, the royal capital of Udong only held ten
thousand people. Most of the Cambodian population existed in small villages with little
interaction with a central government or regime (Chandler 2000, 100). A system of
patronage Was maintained in pre-colonial Cambodia, which often existed within villages
or families, The relationships of this system were viewed as natural, and were generally

mutually beneficial, The client of the relationship provided his patron with crops and
services in return for protection. A Cambodian proverb adequately summarized this
patron-client relationship, and its traditional role in Cambodian society: “The rich must
protect the poor, just as clothing protects the body” (Chandler 2000, 105), Pre-colonial

Cambodia consisted of only two social classes, the rich and the poor (Chandler 2000, 87).
Social relationships were not viewed in terms of rural vs urban or farmer vs merchant,
Cambodians lived their lives in their villages, and political, economic, and social
relationships, while often unequal, were primarily held within the boundaries of these
Villages (Chandler 2000, 100-110).
Pre-colonial Cambodia maintained no bureaucracy or standing army (Chandler

2000, 110). The monarchy was a remote, but respected entity, finding its primary source
of respect in Cambodian mythology (Chandler 2000, 106). While respected, the power of
the king was “rarely enforced, and seldom face-to-face”(Chandler 2000, 107), Precolonial Cambodian society centered around the village, and any oppression faced by the
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population was generally rooted in the patronage system and existed primarily in the
individual village. The rural population gave little practical thought to the central

government (Chandler 2000, 100-110).

Colonization
During the first half of the nineteenth century, Cambodia was constantly
threatened by Thai and Vietnamese forces, as Vietnam slowly began to control its
Cambodian neighbors. Initially, Vietnam exercised loose control over Cambodia in
response to Thai-Vietnamese conflict (Chandler 2000, 119-122). In 1835, Vietnam
began to strengthen its hold on Cambodia in order to protect itself from Thai aggression.
Vietnamese Emperor Minh Mang “sought to mobilize and arm the Khmer, to colonize the
region with Vietnamese, and to reform the habits of the people”(Chandler 2000, 125).
Vietnamese efforts to “reform” Cambodia were largely unsuccessful. These early
colonizers were unable to change “Cambodian agricultural techniques” and their “efforts
to quantify and systemize the land holdings, tax payments, and irrigation works came to
little’(Chandler 2000, 126). The Vietnamese were also unsuccessful in their attempts to

alter Cambodian culture. The one truly lasting effect which Vietnamese control of
Cambodia had on the country was the elevated status afforded to the newly immigrated
Vietnamese in Cambodia.

The Vietnamese placed their own citizens in positions of

power in the Cambodian government. Many of these citizens remained in Cambodia
after Vietnam was ousted from the country (Chandler 2000, 128). Vietnamese control
over Cambodia ended in 1848, with Prince Duang taking the relatively autonomous
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throne. Duang would eventually seek the protection of France against the Vietnamese,

who were a constant threat to Cambodia and the country’s

66.

“traditional

enemies’(Chandler 2000, 135).
French involvement in Cambodia began in the 1850s, but the country truly began

to feel the institutional alterations as France began to tighten its control over Cambodia in
the final years of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth century.

In 1892,

collection of taxes from the Cambodian population had been taken over by the French. In
1904 Prince Monivong Sisowath became the king of Cambodia, hand-picked by the
French authority.

The French slowly modermized Cambodia, but the Cambodian elite

resisted change. The elite saw no value in widening “their intellectual horizons” or need
“to tinker with their beliefs’(Chandler 2000, 148). Since the Cambodians had no desire
to modernize their country, Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants dominated the Frenchencouraged modernization (Chandler 2000, 148). French colonial rule was technically
indirect, as the Cambodian monarchy was left intact and a large part of the government
was comprised of minorities, such as Chinese and Vietnamese.

However, there were also

French residents who acted as vice-roys in colonial Cambodia.

Throughout the early

twentieth century, these French officials became more remote to the Cambodian
population. Automobiles allowed the residents to inspect the country from established
roads, but these inspections were “superficial” as much of the country was still distant
from the system of roads (Chandler 2000, 151). The authority figures that the majority of
Cambodians would come in contact with were Vietnamese agents of the French
administration. The colonial administration was filled with Vietnamese immigrants, as
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they often spoke French, and thus were more suited for cooperation with the French
(Chandler 2000, 151). Throughout its colonial rule, the French authority encouraged
Vietnamese immigration to Cambodia.

Under French colonial rule, Cambodia economically prospered. This prosperity
did not reach the peasant population.

Cambodian farmers could expect to earn about

ninety piastres per year or forty if they farmed independently and sold their crops, while

a French official earned up to twelve thousand piastres per year. Cambodian peasants
were also subjected to severe taxes. The same farmer that earned a maximum of forty
piastres was taxed as much as twelve piastres per year. The Cambodian peasantry was
not only at an economic disadvantage to the French, but also to Chinese merchants, who
enjoyed great prosperity during colonization (Chandler 2000, 155). The Cambodian
peasantry was excluded from the benefits of modernization and was oppressed by the
institutions of colonization.

In addition, the peasantry was increasingly separated from

the growing cities of Cambodia, primarily Phnom Pehn. In 1922, according to a French
official, medical services, electricity, and running water “were almost unknown outside
Phnom Penh”’(Chandler 2000, 156). The French built modern cities in Cambodia, using
tax revenue from the impoverished peasantry, who received very little benefit from the
French authority (Chandler 2000, 155). With this in mind, it is no surprise that the first
step in the 1975 peasant revolution of the Khmer Rouge was the emptying of Cambodia’s

cities and the eradication of one-third of the urban population.
Though they were taxed heavily, the Cambodian peasantry rarely saw the French
colonial authority. Thus, their anger and hate for the oppressive colonial order was
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placed on the minorities, especially the Vietnamese, who they saw as French stooges.
The colonially elevated were seen as the initiators of the changes which had occurred in

Cambodia. In 1975, when Cambodia’s peasantry finally revolted against a century of
institutional oppression, it was this colonially elevated section of society which bore the
brunt of the peasants’ retribution. The peasantry saw the French colonial authority in the
Vietnamese who acted as its pawns, in the Chinese merchants who became rich while

they suffered, and in the urban population who enjoyed the amenities of the city at the
peasantry’s expense. Retribution for thesuffering of the peasantry was directed at the
colonially elevated, who benefitted greatly from French colonization. Retribution was
also exacted against Vietnamese for the early Vietnamese control of Cambodia.

The high

death rate in the Vietnamese population during the 1975 genocide is not an anomaly. The
Vietnamese had been the colonially elevated group since the beginning of the nineteenth
century. The peasantry’s desire for retribution was the overarching motivation in the
destruction of these three sections of the Cambodian population, evidenced by the large
percentages of the population of each section of society that were killed during the
genocide. Clearly the Khmer Rouge wanted to completely destroy these segments of the
population.

While retribution was the primary motivation behind the Cambodian genocide,
Tepression and risk-minimization were also important factors. These motivations can be

partially attributed to the Communist revolution. Retribution is ideological, often driven
by emotion, while repression and risk-minimization are political. While the need for
retribution can be felt by every peasant, the need for repression and risk-minimization is
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primarily felt by the actual leaders of the revolution and the genocide. These leaders are
able to convey this need to the rest of the population, but it begins with them. Though

repression of the former regime and the minimization of risk of a return to the order of
the colonially elevated groups can be explained by the revolutionary manner of the
Khmer Rouge period, I see these factors as closely related to the colonial period.
Colonization proved to the Cambodian peasantry that it was possible for their peasant
society to be destroyed, and that they were vulnerable to oppression.

In peasant

revolutions, an ideology of a new social order, “a visionary utopia where all men are
brothers”, is constructed (Gamst 1974, 48). The peasantry often attempts to restore a real
or imagined social order of the past (Gamst 1974, 48). In Cambodia, the idea of the precolonial peasant society was important to the revolution, as it represented the golden days
of pre-colonial Cambodia.

In order to lessen the vulnerability of the newly established

peasant society, the Khmer Rouge destroyed everyone who might oppose them, and
consequently targeted the colonially elevated Vietnamese, Chinese, and urban
populations.
French indirect colonially rule alienated the Cambodian peasantry. This large
portion of the country’s population was neglected in favor of urban populations and
minority groups.

Similar to the Rwandan genocide, the Cambodian genocide consisted of

acolonially relegated group killing members of a colonially elevated group. Indirect
colonial rule polarized these two groups, and made it possible for the colonially relegated

group to create an ideology that incited hate and fear of the colonially elevated group.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

Rwanda and Cambodia have both experienced something which is frightening and

horrendous. Genocide does not simply harm the victimized population, but also the
political system and economy of the country. Large sections of the population disappear,
including children, creating a hole in the population and the future society of the country.
The exact motivations of the perpetrators of genocide can never be known completely,
but theoretical exploration is an important part of preventing future genocide. I do not
want to blame European colonizers for the atrocities committed during the genocidal
episodes discussed in this study. To blame these people, who are long dead, would be an
empty gesture. I do however want this study to provide a theoretical framework of the
motivations of genocide.
Can we prevent genocide? I think that if we understand the wide array of
motivating factors which influence genocide. My theory allows for the prediction of
genocide in certain former colonies. By examining the divisions which the colonial
authority implemented in these countries, we can distinguish the colonially elevated and
colonially relegated sections of society. It is not possible to predict the year of the
genocide with this information, but by understanding who the possible perpetrators are
(i.e. the colonially relegated group), certain diplomatic efforts can be made to ease the
tension between the colonially relegated and colonially elevated groups. If the

international community can bridge the social rift that was created by indirect colonial
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it can prevent the colonially relegated group from pursuing a policy of retribution
septs sion, and risk-minimization.

ule, je,

| cannot say what country will suffer the ills of genocide next, but I can say that

geno

de is not a thing of the past. This crime has existed since the beginning of

pumanity and, unless a way in which to predict and prevent it is found, it will continue to
plague us until the end of time. Whether it is in Iraq, Tanzania, or Niger, the next
genocidal episode will be just as horrific as the last. The next instance of genocide will
shock the world, just as it did in Rwanda and Cambodia.

If the international community

takes preemptive action, using theoretical studies of the motivations of genocide to
predict the perpetrators of the next genocide, maybe a few genocidal episodes can be

stopped. Simple action now can save thousands, if not millions, in the future.
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Table 1: Types of Colonial Rule in thirty-two post-1943 Genocidal Countries.

Genocidal Country

[Type of Colonial Rule

[Equatorial Guinea
Nigeria

Indirect
Indirect

Congo
Uganda
[Burundi

Indirect
Indirect
Indirect

IRwanda

Indirect

[Ethiopia

INo Colonial Rule

Somalia

Indirect

Angola
[Algeria

Indirect
Indirect

Sudan

Indirect

Madagascar

Direct

Iran

INo Colonial Rule

Iraq

Indirect

Syria

Direct, with some periods of Indirect

[Afghanistan

Indirect

(China

INo Colonial Rule

[Pakistan

Indirect

[Burma
Sn Lanka

Direct
Direct

Cambodia

Indirect

[Laos
Vietnam

Indirect
Indirect

Philippines

Indirect, with a later shift to Direct

Indonesia

Indirect, with a later shift to Direct

Guatemala
El Salvador
Chile

Direct
Direct
Direct

Argentina

Direct

U.S.S.R.
Bosnia

INo Colonial Rule
INo Colonial Rule

Serbia

INo Colonial Rule
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